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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 11, 2017, the Supreme Court of Florida held in Doe v. 
State
1
 that a judicial officer must be physically present at hearings that 
involuntarily commit individuals to mental health facilities pursuant to 
section 394.467 of the 2016 Florida Statutes,
2
 otherwise known as the Baker 
Act.
3
  Fifteen mental health patients brought this case through their public 
defenders in response to an email sent on behalf of a judge and magistrate 
from Lee County, Florida, announcing that Baker Act hearings would be 
held by teleconference from the courthouse, instead of in-person.
4
 
Patient advocates and patients argued that holding Baker Act 
hearings through teleconferences created a myriad of problems that violated 
                                                 
* Clarisa Mondéjar earned her bachelor’s degree at the University of 
Chicago, her master’s degree at the University of Miami, and continued her graduate studies 
as a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, before becoming a Juris 
Doctoral Candidate at Nova Southeastern University’s Shepard Broad College of Law.  
Clarisa would like to thank her mother for always providing her with constant guidance and 
support.  Clarisa also thanks her best friend, who inspired her to choose this topic and was 
present in spirit as she wrote during the summer months of 2017.  Lastly, Clarisa would like to 
express her gratitude to all Nova Law Review members for their time, effort, and dedication 
while editing this Comment. 
1. 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017). 
2. FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016).  Throughout this paper, this statute will be 
referred to as (“The Baker Act”) for uniformity. 
3. Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1022, 1032. 
4. Id. at 1023. 
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patients’ procedural and substantive due process rights.5  These violations 
would affect the fairness of these hearings and could create, or perpetuate, 
abuses sought to be remedied by costly reforms that had been implemented 
by the legislature since the late 1990s.
6
  Adversely, the respondents, judges, 
and court personnel in favor of holding Baker Acts via teleconferences 
argued that involuntary commitment is a civil process—as opposed to a 
criminal process—which means that “no rule, statute, or constitutional 
prohibition” exists banning the use of teleconferences in Baker Act 
hearings.
7
  Respondents also argued that trial court judges had the discretion 
to administer hearings, as they feel most appropriate and effective in the 
absence of an express legal right or constitutional prohibition.
8
  The 
respondents claimed—given the funding limitations of an already indebted 
system—only conducting in-person Baker Act hearings was excessively 
arduous, inefficient, and hindered patients’ treatment and reintroduction into 
society.
9
  The use of teleconferences in Baker Act proceedings provides a 
judge to work within a failing mental health reform system by limiting costs, 
lessening wait time, improving services to the community, and increasing 
efficiency in the rehabilitation and treatment of mental health patients.
10
 
This Comment will examine the public policy and historical 
development of the Baker Act,
11
 the debate over the Act’s constitutionality, 
practicability, and the cost-benefits of the Baker Act’s community-based 
treatment programs for the mentally ill.
12
  This Comment will also examine 
calls to reform the Baker Act and the effectiveness of those reforms.
13
  Part 
IV will analyze the practical and procedural repercussions of the holding in 
Doe v. State that prohibited the use of teleconferencing in Baker Act 
hearings.
14
  Finally, this Comment will conclude with recommendations that 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the judges’ concerns within an underfunded, 
short-sighted, reactionary—rather than proactive—mental health care 
system.
15
 
                                                 
5. Id. at 1026. 
6. See infra Parts IV–V. 
7. Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, 4, Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017) (No. SC16-
1852). 
8. Id. at 2. 
9. See id. at 9, 20. 
10. Id. at 9–10, 14–15. 
11. See infra Part I. 
12. See infra Parts I–II. 
13. See infra Parts II–III. 
14. See infra Part IV. 
15. See infra Part V. 
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A. The Public Policy Behind the Baker Act 
The Baker Act was named after State Representative Maxine Baker, 
who served as chairperson on the House Committee on Mental Health in the 
1960s and into the early 1970s.
16
  The Florida Legislature passed the act into 
law as the Florida Mental Health Act in 1971.
17
  The Act was an overhaul 
revision of the standing mental health laws that had been in existence for 
ninety-seven years.
18
  The Baker Act came of age when government officials 
began to consider patients’ civil rights and protect patients’ rights, while also 
submitting to the necessity and authority of states’ parens patriae.19  The 
intent was to provide mental health patients with the choice to voluntarily 
seek treatment and to provide them with their constitutional rights to liberty 
and due process.
20
 
Before the Baker Act passed, the statutes governing mental illness 
could place a patient into an institution for an undetermined amount of 
time.
21
  Patients could easily be institutionalized into a state hospital 
arbitrarily if “three people signed affidavits and secured the approval of a 
county judge.”22  Children could be placed with adults in these institutions, 
hospitals could request and require payments from the friends or families of 
the patients, and patients were limited to corresponding with only one person 
while institutionalized.
23
 
                                                 
16. STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH 
PROGRAM OFFICE, HISTORY OF THE BAKER ACT: IT’S DEVELOPMENT & INTENT 1 (2002), 
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/laws/histba.pdf; see also Jim Abbott, 
Maxine E. Baker, Originator of State’s Baker Act, Dies, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), Feb. 1, 
1994, at C3; MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE & DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW & POLICY, 
2014 BAKER ACT USER REFERENCE GUIDE:  THE FLA. MENTAL HEALTH ACT i, ix, 
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/laws/BakerActManual.pdf. 
17. STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH 
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1. 
18. Id. 
19. See id.; Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines parens patriae as the “state in its capacity as provider of 
protection to those unable to care for themselves.”  Parens Patriae, supra. 
20. STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH 
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1; see also MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE & DEP’T OF 
MENTAL HEALTH LAW & POLICY, supra note 16, at 22 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.459) 
(explaining that patients must be accorded individual dignity, and it provides that “[a] person 
who is receiving treatment for mental illness shall not be deprived of any constitutional 
rights.”). 
21. STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH 
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
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Emblematic of the deprivations and abuses of the mental health 
system in Florida before the Baker Act, is the United States Supreme Court 
decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson.24  Respondent, Kenneth Donaldson, 
brought his original action against J.B. O’Connor, the superintendent of the 
Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee in 1957.
25
  Donaldson was 
institutionalized by his father, who believed he was suffering from 
delusions.
26
  After a court proceeding in Pinellas County, Donaldson was 
confined for fifteen years for care, maintenance, and treatment against his 
will after he “was found to be suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.”27  
Throughout the fifteen years, Donaldson repeatedly demanded his release 
without success.
28
  While the superintendent denied Donaldson’s demands 
and claimed it was because he was a danger to society, Donaldson stated that 
the hospital was not providing him treatment for his illness.
29
  Testimony at 
the trial court level provided no evidence that Donaldson posed a danger to 
others while he was confined.
30
  Donaldson never showed he was suicidal or 
thought of committing an injury against himself.
31
  Further, Donaldson’s 
demands for relief were supported by responsible individuals who were 
willing to care for him and help him after his release.
32
  Donaldson’s college 
classmate, John Lembcke, wrote the superintendent requesting Donaldson’s 
release, and stated he would take care of the patient, but was refused.
33
  Even 
a representative of the Helping Hands, a halfway house, wrote on behalf of 
Donaldson in 1963 and said they would take on his care upon release.
34
  The 
Supreme Court stated that, at the trial level, “[t]he evidence showed that 
Donaldson’s confinement was a simple regime of enforced custodial care, 
not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness.”35  
“O’Connor described Donaldson’s treatment as milieu therapy,” which the 
                                                 
24. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
25. Id. at 564. 
26. Id. at 565. 
27. Id. at 565–66.  The Mayo Clinic defines paranoid schizophrenia as “a 
severe mental disorder in which people interpret reality abnormally.”  Schizophrenia, MAYO 
CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/schizophrenia/home/ovc-
20253194?p=1 (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).  “Schizophrenia may result in some combination 
of hallucinations, delusions, and extremely disordered thinking and behavior that impairs daily 
functioning, and can be disabling.”  Id.  “Schizophrenia is a chronic condition, requiring 
lifelong treatment.”  Id. 
28. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 565, 567–68. 
29. Id. at 565. 
30. Id. at 568. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 569. 
33. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 569. 
34. Id. at 568. 
35. Id. at 569. 
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hospital staff later described as a polite way of describing Donaldson’s 
unstructured confinement within the hospital.
36
  Hospital staff confirmed that 
his treatment consisted of being kept in a large room with sixty other 
patients, including many who were criminally committed.
37
 
B. The Historical and Systematic Overhaul of the Mental Health 
System:  Deinstitutionalizing the Mentally Ill 
As previously mentioned, the Baker Act was a product of an 
evolving philosophy regarding the treatment of the mentally ill.
38
  Ninety-
seven years came and went where mentally ill patients were locked up in 
hospitals and watched over, as described in Donaldson’s case.39  Patients 
who were perhaps arbitrarily institutionalized by friends, family, or doctors 
could be placed with other patients who were ostensibly ill and those who 
were criminally and homicidally insane.
40
  The mentally ill were not 
considered patients who could be rehabilitated.
41
  Individualized treatment 
with a goal of recovery was overlooked and, instead, public safety was 
prioritized.
42
 
Deinstitutionalization was introduced in the mid-1950s as a response 
to an outcry by mental health advocates and politicians; they argued that 
patients’ civil rights were being violated and that the system was both 
ineffective and a heavy cost burden on the federal and state governments.
43
  
The primary goal of deinstitutionalization was to move treatment out of 
commitments in hospitals and provide treatment through community-based 
outpatient treatment centers.
44
  This movement gained steam because state 
mental hospitals were extremely underfunded, outdated, and excessively 
crowded.
45
  The Baker Act encourages patients to voluntarily admit 
                                                 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. See STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH 
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1, 3. 
39. See id. at 1. 
40. See Jennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War on Drugs:  Administering a 
Lethal Dose to Kendra’s Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2401, 2405 (2000); STATE OF FLA. DEP’T 
OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1. 
41. Cristina Bianchi, America’s Mental Health System:  Closing the Revolving 
Door Between Hospitals, Correctional Facilities & the Streets, 28 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 99, 
102 (2015). 
42. See Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2402. 
43. Steven Strang, Note, Assisted Outpatient Treatment in Ohio:  Is Jason’s 
Law Life-Saving Legislation or a Rash Response?, 19 HEALTH MATRIX:  J.L. MED. 247, 250–
51 (2009); see also Bianchi, supra note 41, at 102–03. 
44. Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2406–07; Strang, supra note 43, at 250–51. 
45. Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2407; Strang, supra note 43, at 251. 
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themselves into psychiatric care if they are competent, but also allows 
individuals to be involuntarily committed and examined if specific criteria 
are met.
46
  The revolution of new medications and newly created monetary 
incentives by the federal government also promoted this shift.
47
 
In 1955, Smith, Kline, and French Laboratories developed the first 
antipsychotic medication to land on the market, Thorazine.
48
  Before the 
introduction of Thorazine, the treatment of diseases, “such as schizophrenia, 
[was] long-term confinement” because no medication proved effective.49  
Thorazine led to mentally ill patients being prone to less violent episodes 
because it relieved mental health symptoms, such as psychosis, delusion, 
paranoia, hallucinations, and irritability.
50
  Mentally ill patients were now 
considered capable of being reintroduced and integrated into society because 
there was a possibility they could function within their communities.
51
  In 
that year, an estimated 560,000 mentally ill patients from state-run hospitals 
were released with no follow-up care provided.
52
  These new medicines, 
coupled with the political environment of the 1960s and its specific focus on 
civil rights, provided patients a voice.
53
  Concerns grew throughout the 
mental health community that patients’ rights to seek and refuse treatment 
were being violated.
54
 
But the most effective and influential push away from 
institutionalization of mental health patients towards deinstitutionalization 
came in 1965.
55
  The federal government began Medicaid in 1965 and 
hospitals could receive payments from patients who had Medicaid.
56
  
However, hospitals realized that discharging mentally ill patients had 
monetary benefits because patients institutionalized in state psychiatric 
                                                 
46. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)–(2) (2016); STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & 
FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, BAKER ACT INVOLUNTARY EXAMINATION: 
CRITERIA, PROCESSES AND TIMEFRAMES 1 (2002), 
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/MentalHealth/laws/bainvex.pdf. 
47. See Bianchi, supra note 41, at 103–04; Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2406; 
Strang, supra note 43, at 251. 
48. Strang, supra note 43, at 250. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 250–51. 
52. Bianchi, supra note 41, at 103. 
53. See Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2406–07; Strang, supra note 43, at 251. 
54. Strang, supra note 43, at 251. 
55. See Ilissa L. Watnik, Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra’s 
Law:  New York’s Solution for Treatment of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1181, 1184–85 (2001) (explaining that Thorazine is also known as chlorpromazine); Bianchi, 
supra note 41, at 103–04; Candice T. Player, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment:  The Limits 
of Prevention, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 168 (2015). 
56. See Watnik, supra note 55, at 1184–85. 
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hospitals were excluded from the Medicaid payment system.
57
  This was not 
an accidental outcome of the changes made to mental health laws and its 
funding made by the legislature; excluding mentally ill patients from the 
Medicaid payment system was done to shift the burden and costs of 
individualized medical care for patients from the federal government to the 
individual states.
58
  By discharging patients out of state hospitals and into 
community-based treatment programs, the states were able to receive 
Medicaid reimbursements.
59
 
C. The Supreme Court’s Historical Declarations Regarding the 
Constitutionality of the Baker Act and the Current Law 
Florida does not specifically prohibit the use of teleconferencing to 
conduct Baker Act hearings.
60
  However, the use of teleconferences during 
these proceedings arguably works in direct opposition to case law precedent 
that aims to ensure that the mentally ill are provided their constitutional right 
of liberty when not dangerous to themselves or others.
61
  In order to commit 
an individual under the Baker Act to a state mental health facility, the State 
must prove specific criteria.
62
  When met, this criteria shows that the 
                                                 
57. Id. 
58. See id. 
59. E. Fuller Torrey, Homelessness, Incarceration, Episodes of Violence:  
Way of Life for Almost Half of Americans with Untreated Schizophrenia and Bipolar, MENTAL 
ILLNESS POL’Y ORG., http://www.mentalillnesspolicy.org/consequences/consequences-2.html 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2017); see also Bianchi, supra note 41, at 104 n.38. 
60. See FLA. STAT. § 394.467(6)(a)(2) (2016); Doe v. State, 210 So. 3d 154, 
157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017); Brief for the Chief 
Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, 
at 5. 
61. FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, INVOLUNTARY INPATIENT 
PLACEMENT 9 (2008), 
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/laws/involinpplac0809.pdf; cf. In re 
Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 489 (Fla. 1977). 
62. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1).  To commit a patient involuntarily into inpatient 
mental health facilities, the finding of the court must meet the following criteria by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
(a)  He or she has a mental illness and because of his or her mental illness: 
1.a.  He or she has refused voluntary inpatient placement for treatment after 
sufficient and conscientious explanation and disclosure of the purpose of inpatient 
placement for treatment; or 
b.  He or she is unable to determine for himself or herself whether inpatient 
placement is necessary; and 
2.a.  He or she is incapable of surviving alone or with the help of willing and 
responsible family or friends, including available alternative services, and, without 
treatment, is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself, 
and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his 
or her well-being; or 
8
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individual is incapable of surviving alone, or that there is significant cause to 
believe that the individual would inflict serious bodily harm upon himself, 
and all less restrictive means and treatment alternatives were judged 
inappropriate.
63
  This is because once the patient is involuntarily committed, 
he or she is deprived of his or her liberty as provided by the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution.
64
 
D. The 1970s:  Establishing a “Clear and Convincing Evidence” 
Standard to Involuntarily Commit Patients 
In the 1970s, Florida courts were preoccupied with determining the 
burden of proof necessary to involuntarily commit a mentally ill patient and 
were also concerned with validating the constitutionality of depriving private 
citizens of their liberty while they were in such vulnerable health states.
65
  A 
patient can be involuntarily committed through a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence that they meet the requirements as set forth in the Baker 
Act.
66
  In 1977, in In re Beverly,
67
 the Supreme Court of Florida held that 
given that the standard of proof of civil commitment hearings was clear and 
convincing evidence, the Baker Act was not unconstitutionally overbroad or 
vague, as long as all the elements of the Baker Act were met by the burden of 
proof described by the court.
68
  Strict adherence to the rules was imperative 
given the serious nature of the deprivation of liberty.
69
  The balance between 
state interests and the individual’s interest70 must be constantly evaluated and 
                                                                                                                   
b.  There is substantial likelihood that in the near future he or she will inflict serious 
bodily harm on self or others, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, 
or threatening such harm; and 
(b)  All available less restrictive treatment alternatives that would offer an 
opportunity for improvement of his or her condition have been judged to be 
inappropriate. 
Id. 
63. Id. 
64. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1); Brief 
for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
supra note 7, at 4; MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE & DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW & 
POLICY, supra note 16, at ix. 
65. See In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 488–90 (Fla. 1977); STATE OF FLA. DEP’T 
OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1. 
66. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)(a)–(b). 
67. 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977). 
68. See id. at 486, 490. 
69. Id. at 489. 
70. Id. at 489–90.  The state’s interest is to protect society from individuals 
who are dangerous either to themselves or to others, while protecting the individual interest 
pertains to providing individuals with their basic constitutional right of freedom without the 
undue imposition of a state’s governmental restraints.  Id. 
9
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weighed.
71
  Neff v. State
72
 reiterated what the Donaldson case had already 
established and held that in Florida, if an individual is mentally ill and unable 
to recognize their illness, they still cannot be held against their will if they 
are considered non-dangerous, capable of caring for themselves, and 
ultimately able to survive despite their mental illness without help.
73
 
E. The 1980s and 1990s:  Explicit Examinations to Determine, Case-
by-Case, if Involuntary Commitment Is Necessary 
By the 1980s and into the 1990s, Florida courts began to define case-
by-case what clear and convincing evidence meant regarding the elements of 
the Baker Act.
74
  They also began defining on a case-by-case basis whether 
involuntary commitment was the appropriate and least restrictive measure 
needed by the patient to meet his or her needs while ensuring the safety of 
the public.
75
  Schexnayder v. State
76
 held that, even if a person was severely 
mentally ill, the state would not meet the clear and convincing burden of 
proof if a person had a place to live, had financial resources, and had 
knowledge they needed medication but would periodically forget their 
medication, which often led to the patient’s hospitalization.77  Despite the 
patient’s mood changes and hospitalizations, the court held that these 
instances did not show clear and convincing evidence that she was dangerous 
to herself or the public or that these events led to substantial harm to her 
well-being.
78
 
The Everett v. State
79
 case, in 1988, demonstrated the incredible and 
detrimental impact an incorrectly imposed court order of involuntary 
commitment against an individual can have on the liberty rights of that 
patient within the Baker Act system.
80
  The patient appealed the finding by 
the circuit court that held that she be involuntarily committed at a treatment 
facility to the First District Court of Appeal.
81
  The First District Court of 
                                                 
71. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 489–90. 
72. 356 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
73. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); Neff, 356 So. 2d at 
903. 
74. Everett v. State, 524 So. 2d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) 
(citing Schexnayder v. State, 495 So. 2d 850, 851–52 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986)); see also 
Welk v. State, 542 So. 2d 1343, 1344–45 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
75. See Burley v. State, 59 So. 3d 131, 134 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
76. 495 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
77. Id. at 851–52. 
78. Id. 
79. 524 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
80. See id. at 1092–93. 
81. Id. at 1092. 
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 6
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/6
2017] THE PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL REPERCUSSIONS 149 
Appeal reversed the decision of the circuit court because it found that the 
State did not provide evidence that showed involuntary placement was 
necessary and that she refused voluntary placement for mental health 
treatment.
82
  The devastating result in this case was that the appeal process 
endured beyond the original court order and, when the original court order 
expired, she had already been ordered to continue her involuntary 
placement.
83
  While the district court agreed that the State had not met its 
burden of proof in the original hearing, the order for continuing involuntary 
placement was not automatically considered null and void.
84
  Further, the 
patient’s liberty and time spent involuntarily committed while waiting for the 
appeal to be heard by the court could not be undone or recovered.
85
 
Welk v. State
86
 established that if there is insufficient evidence to 
show that a person poses real and current harm to themselves or others, then 
involuntary commitment is not justified even if an expert testifies that 
without supervision problems with the mentally ill patient will continue to 
arise.
87
  The Fifth District Court of Appeal held in Hedrick v. Florida 
Hospital Medical Center
88
 that even if the State can prove that the patient 
shows potential for poor judgment, without the evidence of a present and 
current threat to substantially harm himself or herself or someone else, the 
statutory test of clear and convincing evidence was not met.
89
  Conclusory 
statements that a patient had potential to cause substantial harm to himself 
and a potential for aggression did not meet the clear and convincing evidence 
standard to substantiate a court ordered continued involuntary placement 
under the Baker Act.
90
  Even the testimony of a psychologist stating that a 
patient should be institutionalized through the Baker Act—because she was 
incapable of taking care of herself and surviving alone, and would cause her 
own suffering through neglect and a refusal to take care of herself—did not 
pass the clear and convincing evidence standard according to the First 
District Court of Appeal in the Archer v. State
91
 case.
92
  The test was not met 
because the psychologist conceded that the patient had not threatened to hurt 
                                                 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Everett, 524 So. 2d. at 1092–93. 
85. See id. 
86. 542 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
87. See id. at 1344–45. 
88. 633 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
89. Id. at 1153–54. 
90. See id. 
91. 681 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
92. Id. at 300–01. 
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herself or others, and the patient testified that she would take her 
medication.
93
 
To this end, the First District Court of Appeal in Lyon v. State,
94
 held 
that a schizophrenic woman, who refused to care for herself and was “likely 
to suffer from neglect,” did not show signs of a “real [or] present threat of 
substantial harm” to herself or anyone else and did not meet the requirements 
of involuntary commitment under the Baker Act.
95
  In this case, a doctor 
stated that the woman would become incoherent in her speech, would be 
unable to take care of herself, and would need supervision and structure 
when and if she did not take her medications.
96
  Still, despite these 
statements in the trial court hearing, the appellate court reversed the 
involuntary commitment order and found that the trial court’s holding did not 
meet the clear and convincing evidence burden.
97
  In Adams v. State,
98
 a 
petition for the involuntary placement of a patient for treatment was not 
granted because it did not meet the clear and convincing evidence burden, 
since a witness mentioned in the original Baker Act petition was not present 
at the hearing.
99
  This highlighted the ever-important issue of ensuring that 
the liberty of a patient is not deprived, without confirmation that all 
information and facts within the petition are confirmed by the judge, and 
rendered presently clear and convincing that the patient meets all the Baker 
Act requirements.
100
 
F. The Role of Teleconferences in Baker Act Hearings: State’s Interests 
Versus Mental Health Patients’ Constitutional Rights 
Historically, there are court proceedings that occur by video, such as 
arraignments.
101
  On November 12, 1998, video hearings were suggested as a 
means for involuntary commitment hearings to be held in a more convenient 
and cost-effective manner.
102
  While some judges commented that the 
videoconferences would lessen the need for patients to be transported to the 
courthouse, other mental health professionals pointed out several issues 
regarding mental health patients being provided their court hearings through 
                                                 
93. Id. at 301. 
94. 724 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam). 
95. Id. at 1241–42; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016). 
96. Lyon, 724 So. 2d at 1242. 
97. Id. at 1243. 
98. 713 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
99. See id. at 1063–64. 
100. See id. 
101. FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 61, at 9. 
102. Id. 
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videoconferences.
103
  Many mental health patients suffer from paranoia and 
will react negatively to video hearings.
104
  Mental health patients can be 
confused and unable to understand that the videoconference was a formal 
court hearing.
105
  Representatives from the Mental Health Program Office of 
the Department of Children and Families were concerned that the use of 
videos to conduct court hearings would deter mental health patients from 
participating in their involuntary placement proceedings.
106
  Judge Winifred 
Sharp, from the Fifth District Court of Appeal, admitted that it would be 
difficult to make a video proceeding feel like a formal court hearing, making 
it more difficult to ensure that a patient understands the proceeding was a 
formalized court proceeding which determines stakes as serious as their 
liberty and possible involuntary commitment.
107
  While the legislature never 
enacted the recommendations of the Supreme Court Commission, the 
Commission did recommend that to improve administrative justice during 
Baker Act hearings the use of videoconferences for involuntary placement 
hearings should not be used.
108
 
The Supreme Court of Florida cited to Ibur v. State,
109
 which stated, 
“[b]ecause involuntary commitment is a substantial deprivation of liberty at 
which fundamental due process protections must attach, the patient cannot be 
denied the right to be present, to be represented by counsel, and to be 
heard.”110 
Part of the specified criteria in the Baker Act is that an evidentiary 
hearing must be conducted for involuntary inpatient treatment.
111
  The court 
must also conduct the hearing within five court-working-days, except for 
when a continuance is granted.
112
  And unless otherwise represented, the 
individual will be appointed a public defender by the court within one court-
working-day.
113
  The Baker Act requires that, unless for good cause, the 
hearing would be held in the county or facility where the patient was located, 
as deemed appropriate.
114
  The hearing would need to be “convenient [for] 
the patient [and] consistent with orderly procedure,” and would need to be in 
                                                 
103. See id. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. 
106. FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 61, at 9. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. 765 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
110. Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Ibur, 765 So. 2d 
at 276). 
111. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(2), (6) (2016). 
112. Id. § 394.467(6)(a)1. 
113. Id. § 394.467(4). 
114. Id. § 394.467(6)(a)2. 
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a physical setting that is not dangerous to the patient’s condition.115  
Magistrates, along with judges, are allowed to preside over these hearings.
116
 
These procedural safeguards were established by the legislature to 
protect and recognize that individuals who fell under the auspices of the 
Baker Act were some of “the most vulnerable individuals of . . . society.”117  
No doubt, the safeguard spelling out that hearings must be held by judges 
physically present was not in the statute.
118
 
II. RECIDIVISM AND THE PUSH FOR REFORM 
Before twenty years had passed since the Baker Act’s initial 
implementation, calls for reform were prevalent throughout Florida.
119
  
Reformers and civilians alike began to question the effectiveness of the 
Baker Act system at providing patients with treatment without depriving 
them of their constitutional rights.
120
  In many cases, mentally ill patients 
could not recognize they were ill and needed services.
121
  The Baker Act’s 
aim was to promote families and patients to voluntarily seek help at 
outpatient community centers, yet patients consistently lacked the insight to 
know they were ill.
122
  The Baker Act was originally drafted to authorize law 
enforcement officers and agents to provide emergency services through 
                                                 
115. Id. 
116. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(6)(a)3. 
117. Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1025 (Fla. 2017). 
118. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467. 
119. FLA. STAT. § 394.467; see also STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & 
FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 2; Mark D. Killian, Fairness 
Commission Says Baker Act Is in Need of an Overhaul, FLA. B. NEWS (Feb. 1, 2000), 
http://www.floridabar.org/news/tfb-
news/?durl=%2FDIVCOM%2FJN%2Fjnnews01.nsf%2FArticles%2FD7ADEF93C0A14EE7
85256B1100775780; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, Baker Act Reform:  Protect 
the Vulnerable with Changes in Law, SUN-SENTINEL (Feb. 18, 2004), http://www.sun-
sentinel.com/opinion/sfl-edittdmental4feb18-story.html. 
120. See Killian, supra note 119 (explaining that in the 1990s, while the law 
required a Baker Act hearing to occur within four to five days after the initial seventy-two-
hour involuntary commitment time had passed and a petition was filed, only 40–50% of Baker 
Act hearings would occur within that time frame).  Thus, 50–60% of Baker Act hearings were 
not occurring within the statutory time frame, and individuals were being effectively held 
against their will without committing a crime and without recourse to combat their 
detainment.  Id.  Hence, these individuals were denied their constitutional right to due process 
during this time.  See id. 
121. See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
122. Paul F. Stavis, The Nexum:  A Modest Proposal for Self-Guardianship by 
Contract:  A System of Advance Directives and Surrogate Committees-at-Large for the 
Intermittently Mentally Ill, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 21–22 (1999); see also 
STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 
16, at 1. 
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inpatient involuntary commitments to stabilize persons dangerous to 
themselves or others for only seventy-two hours.
123
  These two elements 
combined led to individuals being repeatedly involuntarily committed.
124
  
From 1965 until 1995, involuntary commitments increased dramatically,
125
 
and in 2002, over 900 Florida adult patients were admitted to hospitals 
through the Baker Act over four times.
126
  In one extreme case, a patient 
received forty-one examinations, and cost the State of Florida in excess of 
$81,000.
127
 
Reforms attempting to overhaul the Baker Act in 1996 and 1999 did 
not rid Florida’s Mental Health system of the constitutional abuses against 
patients.
128
  The overhaul, from as recently as 1996, attempted to lessen 
inappropriate commitments, such as vulnerable elderly individuals who were 
committed despite not needing psychiatric treatment.
129
  These abuses 
continued because patients became vulnerable once they were placed in the 
seventy-two hour hold and unable to voluntarily make any decisions until 
either released from the hospital or released by a judge.
130
  Further, while the 
law guarantees that involuntary commitment will be imposed upon an 
individual when all other methods are exhausted and the commitment is 
considered the least restrictive means for that patient to receive help, the 
definition of least restrictive is in itself up for interpretation.
131
  Receiving 
facilities and hospitals are allowed to hold a patient for seventy-two hours if 
the patient meets the involuntary commitment criteria.
132
  However, they 
may also ask a judge to allow them to hold a patient for longer periods if the 
facility feels that the person is a harm to themselves or others.
133
  In these 
                                                 
123. South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
124. See id. 
125. See Torrey, supra note 59. 
126. South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
127. Id. 
128. See Jonathan Abel, Police Resort to Baker Act for a 7-Year-Old’s 
Tantrum, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 14, 2009, at 1B; Carol Marbin Miller, Locked in 
Hospital, Woman Caught in Baker Act Fight, MIAMI HERALD: MIAMI-DADE CTY. (Aug. 18, 
2015, 9:05 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/article31483943.html. 
129. Miller, supra note 128. 
130. Id.; see also STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL 
HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 46, at 3. 
131. See Miller, supra note 128; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, 
supra note 119. 
132. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)–(2) (2016) (referring to the criteria a 
patient must meet by clear and convincing evidence in order to be involuntarily committed 
under the Baker Act). 
133. Miller, supra note 128. 
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instances, the facility receives Medicaid money to cover the cost of 
treatment—putting a price tag on each Baker Act patient’s head.134 
 
A. Unfunded and Short-Sighted Reforms Lead to a Resurgence of Old 
Abuses and Re-Institutionalization via Criminalization and Incarceration 
 
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Florida Commission on Fairness 
organized and evaluated whether the 1970s Baker Act was providing 
treatment, access, and opportunities to participate and receive services 
through the state court system in an equal manner.
135
  The chair of the 
Commission was Eleventh Circuit Judge Gill S. Freeman, and she wrote that 
Florida “failed to develop . . . adequate . . . community programs [that met] 
the needs of its people.”136  In 1997, the Commission reported that over half 
a million people in the State of Florida suffered from mental illness—more 
than 300,000 from Alzheimer’s; that “more than 70,000 [people] were 
involuntarily examined [by] the Baker Act;” and close to “20,000 petitions 
for involuntary civil commitment [were filed requesting] psychiatric 
treatment.”137  The Commission focused on the idea that inadequate funding 
was the main problem in meeting the goals and purpose described by the 
1970s Baker Act.
138
  The system was slowed down and, as a result, 
detentions in involuntary civil commitments became lengthier, and abuses 
began to increase because monetary gains could be achieved by holding 
individuals for longer than necessary, especially with regard to the elderly.
139
  
“[T]he tension between fiscally driven policy and clinically desirable 
outcomes” has been named the key cause of these issues.140  The switch from 
treating mentally ill patients with federally funded money to providing them 
treatment through state-funded programs has caused a major shift in how 
treatment is provided to patients and what patients qualify for state-funded 
help.
141
 
                                                 
134. Id.; see also Killian, supra note 119. 
135. See Killian, supra note 119. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. See id. 
139. See id. 
140. Jeffrey L. Gellar, Excluding Institutions for Mental Diseases from Federal 
Reimbursement for Services:  Strategy or Tragedy?, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1397, 1397 
(2000). 
141. See id. at 1399; Derek Gilliam, Panel Looks at Mental Health Reform; 
Proper Treatment and Funding Could Help Many More in Need, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Jan. 30, 
2015, at B8 (explaining that this tension in 2015 was a result of Medicare only reimbursing 
60% of treatment provided to patients who qualified for Medicare funds, and the lack of funds 
coupled with a “lack of uniformity [between] mental health courts, . . . a shortage of 
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Other major issues that the Commission cited as to why the Baker 
Act needed reform were:  (1) time frames were not defined and up to 
interpretation—five days could mean “five working days or five consecutive 
days;” (2) no due process was afforded to a patient until the court hearing 
occurred; (3) “justice system participants [were] not always . . . trained on 
[the] mental health issues” they were either representing or making 
judgments; (4) almost exclusively, mental health patients were only 
represented by public defenders; (5) the quality of representation was not 
uniform, despite most being represented by their county’s public defender 
office; (6) resources to public defenders were not uniform; (7) 
communication about the priority which these cases were to take in public 
defender offices was not uniform; (8) compliance by state attorneys’ offices 
to represent and participate at every involuntary commitment hearing did not 
always occur, leading to the release of dangerous patients; (9) law 
enforcement officials and agencies lacked training on mental health as well; 
and (10) persons were, and could be, involuntarily committed because of the 
vindictiveness of an enraged spouse or neighbor given some officials were 
not trained properly.
142
  Beyond these issues cited by the Commission, the 
deinstitutionalized system depended on patients who lacked self-recognition 
and insight by mental health patients that they were sick and needed help.
143
 
Mental health advocates argued that as the system stood in 2004, a 
reform was needed because the system “deinstitutionaliz[ed] . . . persons 
with mental illness [away] from . . . mental health hospitals” and, ultimately, 
led them to “their re-institutionalization [within] the criminal justice 
system.”144  In 1992, a Public Citizen Survey found that sometimes 
individuals with no charges against them are incarcerated because they are 
waiting for a psychiatric evaluation, a hospital bed, or transportation to the 
hospital.
145
  One sheriff in Florida stated, “I have had mentally ill inmates in 
paper gowns in holding cells for close observation for up to six weeks before 
we could find a hospital bed for them.”146 
                                                                                                                   
psychiatrists, and [a] need for flexible spending” created a system that was constantly in 
turmoil). 
142. Killian, supra note 119. 
143. Id.; see also Stavis, supra note 122, at 21–22. 
144. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 6 (Apr. 
1, 2004); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY 
ILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD:  MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE, 
SAN BERNADINO, AND ANCHORAGE 2, 10 (2000), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182504.pdf. 
145. E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S 
MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 37 (1997). 
146. Id. 
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B. The Disastrous Failures of Deinstitutionalization and the Move to 
Implement New Reforms in 2004 
In July 1998, forty-three year old Alan Singletary of Seminole 
County, Florida, killed Deputy Eugene Gregory after a thirteen-hour standoff 
ensued over a simple landlord-tenant dispute.
147
  Singletary had untreated 
schizophrenia, and his family had sought help for him for years without 
success.
148
  The landlord-tenant dispute quickly plummeted into a confusing 
and unsettling “standoff between Singletary, Seminole [Florida] Sheriff’s 
deputies, and SWAT team members.”149  Ultimately, Singletary died after 
killing Deputy Gregory and wounding two other law enforcement officers.
150
  
Politicians and law enforcement agents would state that this incident was 
emblematic of a growing “law enforcement and humanitarian issue” 
regarding the treatment of mentally ill patients.
151
  While Florida was 
considered a pioneer in mental health law, heavy burdens induced upon law 
enforcement, the court system, and hospital crisis units made the 
practicalities of enforcing the 1971 Baker Act exceedingly difficult.
152
  
Loopholes in implementing the law existed and continuing care was not 
provided.
153
  If an inpatient bed was not readily available, that patient was 
released, and the continued care they needed was not always provided.
154
 
By 2004, a call for Baker Act reform headed by Seminole County 
Sheriff Don Eslinger, made it to the State Legislature calling for sustained 
outpatient commitment orders combined with intensive mental health 
services.
155
  On the session’s last day, a major rewrite of the Baker Act was 
instituted.
156
  The reform was enacted into law by Governor Jeb Bush in 
2004.
157
  The push was to begin to enact reforms; to create avenues which 
                                                 
147. In Memoriam…, CATALYST: SPECIAL FLA. EDITION (Treatment Advocacy 
Ctr., Arlington, Va.), Summer 2004, at 9. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Jan Pudlow, Baker Act Rewrite Calls for Outpatient Treatment, FLA. B. 
NEWS, June 1, 2004, at 7. 
152. Lilac, Editorial, Sensible Help; Our Position:  Continuing Treatment 
Should Be Required for Violent Mental Patients., ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), Jan. 25, 2004, at 
G2; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016); In Memoriam..., supra note 147, at 9; Killian, 
supra note 119. 
153. Lilac, supra note 152; see also In Memoriam…, supra note 147, at 9. 
154. TORREY, supra note 145, at 10; Lilac, supra note 152. 
155. See Pudlow, supra note 151. 
156. Id. 
157. New Help, New Hope, in Florida, CATALYST: SPECIAL FLA. EDITION, 
(Treatment Advoc. Ctr., Arlington, Va.), Summer 2004, at 1; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467 
(2016). 
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provide mental health patients with the resources they need—while keeping 
the public safe: to not create confusion in an underfunded mental health 
system; and to not overburden the court system.
158
  Mental health advocates 
believed that people with serious mental illness could avoid hospitalization if 
they received early interventions and treatments that were appropriate before 
their mental health deteriorated.
159
 
Mental health advocates began to look at other states’ mental health 
systems and eventually fixated on New York’s Kendra’s Law.160  The law in 
New York authorized court ordered assisted outpatient treatment to 
individuals with mental illness.
161
  Kendra’s Law, developed after a man 
with severe mental illness who was unable to comply with doctor’s orders 
and medical prescriptions, pushed thirty-two-year-old Kendra Webdale into a 
New York City subway train and killed her.
162
  Many Baker Act reforms 
were passed in 2004, intending to solve the problems that were discussed 
above.
163
  However, the amount allotted to institute these reforms was 
devastatingly under the estimated $150 million needed to institute Kendra’s 
Law in its first five years.
164
  Citing only to a 25% government match and 
one additional administrator at each mental health location to input 
additional data, the bill only loosely defined its financial terms and 
reforms.
165
 
Judges and other legal personnel in Florida’s criminal system argued 
that persons with mental illness often committed misdemeanors and would 
cycle in and out of county jails.
166
  This was attributed by judges and legal 
professionals in the criminal legal community as resulting from persons with 
mental illness not being diagnosed correctly; the lack of management of 
mental health patients outside inpatient facilities, and that for some 
individuals treatment only occurred when in jail, but was discontinued, along 
with their use of medications, once released from imprisonment.
167
  Some 
even argued that the newest rewrite of the Baker Act would save money by 
                                                 
158. See Pudlow, supra note 151. 
159. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 6 (Apr. 
1, 2004). 
160. See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id.; see also Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff 
Analysis 1. 
164. See Fla. H.R. Comm. On Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 
12; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
165. Fla. H.R. Comm. On Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 12–13. 
166. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 9. 
167. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 6. 
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keeping patients out of a revolving door of expensive hospitals and jails.
168
  
While others predicted oppositely and believed that the legislation that came 
with no funding would, in fact, overburden courts and create confusion; and 
the workload cost, while not determined, would undoubtedly be excessive.
169
  
The legislation was deemed by many as a mandate without resources, both in 
physical and monetary support.
170
  Even the House of Representatives’ Staff 
Analysis Report stated that HB 463 would create a recurring fiscal impact, 
but only estimated the impact to be at $636,608 to $954,912.
171
 
Given that the laws put into place in 2004 were modeled after New 
York’s Kendra’s Law, the recurring estimated amount to fund SB 700/HB 
463 was grossly underestimated over the actual cost of $150 million to 
institute Kendra’s Law in New York.172  The $150 million was only allotted 
to pay for the first five years of its implementation.
173
  Beyond the 
considerable discrepancy between the amount used to fund Kendra’s Law 
and the amount estimated to institute the 2004 reforms, the workload cost 
was described as the most detrimental in the 2000 Commission on Fairness 
Report, which stated that more training on mental health issues was needed 
and more thorough efforts by those representing and involuntarily 
committing patients needed to be provided to both protect the patient and the 
state’s interests.174  Judge Mel Grossman from the Seventeenth Circuit 
pointed to the fact that the legislation entitled patients to resources that the 
State did not currently have.
175
  “[T]he statute talks about entitlements to 
guardian advocates.  In most areas of the state, there are very few people.  
[You are] talking about people committing to multi-year supervision, 
because mental illness is not something that is cured overnight.  I think there 
will be some difficulty there.”176  President of the Florida Public Defender 
Association, Nancy Daniels, stated that the new legislation would very likely 
“bring a lot of new cases into the system.”177 
A major problem that Kendra’s Law faced in New York, and persists 
as a major concern in Florida, is that the mentally ill will become 
incarcerated, homeless, and loiter in public spaces.
178
  Laws focused on 
                                                 
168. Pudlow, supra note 151. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 14. 
172. Id.; see also South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
173. See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
174. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 12; 
Killian, supra note 119; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
175. Pudlow, supra note 151. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. See id.; Watnik, supra note 55, at 1186–87. 
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deinstitutionalizing mental health, such as Kendra’s Law, moved away from 
traditional notions of mental illness treatment that institutionalized patients in 
hospitals where they received structured, guided, and controlled care.
179
  
Kendra’s Law was a move towards deinstitutionalization of mental health 
treatment for patients.
180
  The move to deinstitutionalize allowed patients to 
gain liberty in exchange for treatment.
181
  However, those who are 
imminently at danger often qualify for outpatient treatment until an actual 
danger, risk, or harm occurs.
182
  While patients gain their liberty and freedom 
through this process, the discharge of thousands of mentally ill patients from 
psychiatric hospitals, without providing a means to ensure that those same 
patients receive and take the medications they need to stay healthy, creates a 
crisis produced by deinstitutionalization.
183
 
One major contribution to the predicted workload increase was a 
new requirement that all Baker Act cases be reviewed every six months, 
making for heavy traffic within the court system without any resources or 
means to meet the excess demands on the court system.
184
  Predicting these 
difficulties, a prosecutor and chair for the House Appropriations Committee, 
Republican Bruce Kyle put in an amendment that funds would be provided 
to “state attorneys and public defenders” to assuage the predicted increase 
workload.
185
  However, the amendment was later taken off, before the bill 
was actually passed in the House by final vote 100 to 15.
186
  Ultimately, the 
bill was passed and predictions were that hearings would double or even 
triple, yet few resources were offered by politicians to alleviate 
implementing laws through practical procedures.
187
  Judge Grossman stated 
the frustration felt by many:  “They gave us no money to go with this.  They 
[did not] give us any new judges.  It is an unfunded mandate.”188 
                                                 
179. See Pudlow, supra note 151; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, 
supra note 119; E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz, Why Deinstitutionalization Turned 
Deadly, WALL ST. J. (N.Y.), Aug. 4, 1998, at A18. 
180. See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
181. Watnik, supra note 55, at 1185–86; see also TORREY, supra note 145, at 8, 
10. 
182. See Watnik, supra note 55, at 1187 n.29; Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 
179. 
183. See Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 179. 
184. Pudlow, supra note 151. 
185. See id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
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C. The Curious Case of Cindy Mertz:  Abuses Recalling Back to 
Florida’s Mental Health System Pre-Baker Act Still Exist 
A systematic upheaval, the deinstitutionalization of a system, and a 
revolving door of reforms have not rid Florida’s Mental Health System of the 
abuses and problems that the Baker Act promised and aimed to resolve since 
1971.
189
  The case of Cindy Mertz is one case that typifies this abuse.
190
  
Mertz was an intellectually disabled twenty-one-year-old who was held 
under the Baker Act in 2015.
191
  She was a child of abuse, placed into the 
foster system, and eventually adopted by a family in 2008.
192
  Against the 
wishes of her adopted family who became her legal guardians, Mertz was 
locked into North Tampa Behavioral Health Hospital instead of the state-
funded group home where staff and her family had placed her originally.
193
  
North Tampa Behavioral Health is owned by Acadia Healthcare—a 
conglomerate that runs 225 health facilities in thirty-seven states.
194
  North 
Tampa Behavior Health came into trouble, only a year earlier, when a 
woman admitted herself into the hospital voluntarily and was then refused 
release.
195
  The hospital was also criticized in 2014 for not ensuring that 
patients were competent to consent when admitting themselves pursuant to 
what the Baker Act laws in Florida require.
196
  At the time the article was 
printed, August 18, 2015, Mertz had been locked up for three weeks in the 
North Tampa Behavioral Health Hospital, well beyond the seventy-two hour 
hold prescribed by the Baker Act.
197
  Nikki Drake, a board member of the 
National Association for Mental Illness, wrote an email to hospital staff on 
August 13, 2015, asking what needed to be done in order for Mertz to leave 
the hospital.
198
  She stated in the email, “[s]he can[not] live there.  You 
[cannot] cure her developmental disability.”199  Two days after the original 
article was published in the Miami Herald, Mertz was sent back to her group 
                                                 
189. See FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1) (2016); Bianchi, supra note 41, at 102–04, 
113, 117–19; Editorial, Baker Act Is Inadequate and Overused, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Nov. 8, 
2015, at F4; Miller, supra note 128. 
190. See Miller, supra note 128. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Miller, supra note 128. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
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home.
200
  The original arguments for keeping her in the hospital no longer 
appeared to apply as reasons for keeping her in the facility.
201
 
Mertz’s case is not unique, and it is possible under the Baker Act to 
be taken against one’s will legally.202  Richard Smith’s seven-year-old son 
was involuntarily committed into a mental institution by officers and school 
officials when he threw a temper-tantrum in his second-grade class.
203
  After 
reporting to the boy’s elementary school, seeing a classroom torn apart, 
hearing he stepped on a teacher’s foot, and battered another school official, 
the officers decided that the boy needed to be evaluated for his mental 
health.
204
  While school officials and officers believe that their decision to 
have the boy involuntarily committed under the Baker Act was valid, other 
legal officials, and the boy’s parents, believe that this was an abuse of the 
mental health system, given that the most harm caused was stepping on a 
teacher’s foot.205  In Pinellas County alone, in the school year of 2008 to 
2009, between August and early February, the Pinellas School Police 
reported that it Baker Acted eighty-three children within its system alone.
206
 
III. REFORM FAILURE WITHIN FLORIDA’S BAKER ACT SYSTEM AND THE 
CAUSES OF SYSTEMIC ABUSE 
The numerous allegations of abuse and the general overbreadth of 
those alleged abuses have many causes.
207
  The 2004 reforms were instituted 
as a humane measure that would prevent the mentally ill from hurting 
                                                 
200. Carol Marbin Miller, Woman Locked in Florida Mental Hospital Released 
to Her Group Home, MIAMI HERALD: FLA. (Aug. 20, 2015, 11:56 AM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article31620170.html. 
201. See id.; Miller, supra note 128. 
202. See FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016); Abel, supra note 128. 
203. Abel, supra note 128. 
204. Id. 
205. See id. 
206. Id. (comparing this number to the fact that the figure of eighty-three 
children, in less than six months, excludes all other legal agencies in the area and is specific to 
the Pinellas School Police Force); see also Laura C. Morel, Numbers Show Surge in Baker Act 
Exams of Kids in Tampa Bay Area, TAMPA BAY TIMES: NEWS (Dec. 19, 2016, 10:55 AM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/numbers-show-surge-in-baker-act-exams-of-
kids-in-tampa-bay-area/2306799 (referring to the fact that children are being committed 
involuntarily by the school system and parents because there is no oversight of the initial 
commitment by the court system and patient/minor child confidentiality prevents further 
investigation into the matter). 
207. Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, SUN-SENTINEL 
(Dec. 15, 2016, 1:52 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-more-judges-needed-
20161215-story.html; see also Miller, supra note 128; Editorial, supra note 189; Associated 
Press, Involuntary Health Commitments Surge in Minors, HEALTH NEWS FLA. (Dec. 20, 2016), 
http://www.health.wusf.usf.edu/post/involuntary-mental-health-commitments-surge-minors. 
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themselves or others.
208
  Yet, a Times-Union editorial declared—as recent as 
November 2015—the 2004 reforms had not solved the problems they set out 
to resolve.
209
 
A. Misuse and Abuse of the Baker Act System:  Ever-Increasing 
Involuntary Commitments 
From 2004 to 2015, involuntary commitments in Florida increased 
by 64%.
210
  The Times-Union reported that involuntary commitments were 
often misused and abused.
211
  The article referenced reported Baker Act 
hospitalizations by schools and parents who cannot or will not care for their 
difficult children.
212
  Meanwhile, the frail, elderly population—who suffer 
from dementia and act out as a symptom of the disease or other illnesses—
are also often Baker Acted
213
 rather than placed where their needs would be 
better addressed.
214
  While mental health advocates applauded the Baker Act 
in the 1970s, they are now concerned with the Baker Act being a dumping 
ground used to commit and institutionalize individuals when the system has 
nowhere else to place them.
215
 
Continuous increases in involuntary commitments also reflect mental 
health advocates’ concerns regarding the validity of research used to promote 
the status-quo and subdue the call for more reforms of the current Baker Act 
system.
216
  While Baker Act patients are in contact with substance abuse 
services, mental health advocates question the validity of that research and 
state real concerns about a missing connection or coordination between 
those Baker Acted and substance abuse services.
217
  This problem becomes 
compounded in situations where the mentally ill are homeless or without 
resources and help once released.
218
  Once released, the revolving door 
                                                 
208. See Editorial, supra note 189. 
209. See id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Miller, supra note 128; see also Voices on Baker Act Reform, TREATMENT 
ADVOC. CTR., 
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/voices_on_baker_act_reform.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2017).  It is generally understood and accepted that if someone is Baker 
Acted, he or she has been involuntarily committed under the Baker Act.  Voices on Baker Act 
Reform, supra. 
214. See Editorial, supra note 189. 
215. Id. 
216. See id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
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becomes almost inevitable as patients leave with only pills, a prescription, 
and no easy access to continued mental health care.
219
 
The Baker Act Reporting Center reported that thirty-one mental 
health patients were Baker Acted sixteen or more times in one year alone.
220
  
From 2004 to 2013, close to 350 patients were involuntarily committed over 
thirty-six times or more.
221
  This problem worsened when each institution 
and the bodies of professionals who were required to act in involuntary civil 
commitments acted independently and disjointedly.
222
  The Times-Union 
Editorial Board opined and warned that these issues were a product of a 
broken system and an obvious result of legislators passing reforms without 
providing the necessary funding to enact the reforms.
223
  Florida ranks forty-
ninth out of fifty states regarding the amount of money it spends on mental 
health.
224
  Annette Christy, who was in charge of Florida’s Baker Act 
Reporting Center in 2015, stated that there was a need for funds and that, 
unfortunately, tragedy appears to be one of the few triggers that will 
stimulate the funds needed.
225
 
B. Competing Authorities and Interests:  Who Prevails?  How Can 
Information Be Communicated to Meet the Needs of the Patient and 
Competing Authorities? 
W.M. v. State
226
 established that multiple divisions and courts 
representing the State can have concurrent jurisdiction overseeing the 
involuntary inpatient placement hearings of patients involuntarily 
committed.
227
  This can result in what is seen in the W.M. case:  A patient 
can be committed for a short period of time and then be mandated by a 
facility administrator to stay a longer term than the circuit court’s initial 
determination.
228
  The facility administrator only needed to determine the 
patient was incompetent to act on his or her own behalf.
229
  Further, given the 
confidential nature of the patients and separate oaths of confidentiality 
between the patient, psychiatrists, lawyers, guardians, and mental health 
                                                 
219. Editorial, supra note 189. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. See id. 
223. Id. 
224. Editorial, supra note 189. 
225. Id. 
226. 992 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
227. Id. at 384, 388. 
228. Id. at 384–86. 
229. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)–(2) (2016); W.M., 992 So. 2d at 384; Miller, 
supra note 128. 
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advocates, necessary oversight over each patient, case, the facilities, and 
treatment becomes almost impossible without inherently violating a patient’s 
right to privacy.
230
 
Referring back to the case of the Cindy Mertz, a major cause of her 
alleged kidnapping resulted from competing authorities, interests, and an 
inability to communicate clearly.
231
  Communication between judges, mental 
health advocates, and the hospital was not handled in-person and primarily 
done through varying forms of technology—either email or the phone.232   
These technological communications prevented immediate actions from 
being taken, and allowed for delays, as the allegations of Mertz’s advocates 
and guardian—based primarily on their communications over phone and 
email with hospital staff and Mertz—were weighed against the alleged 
observations of hospital staff and administrators.
233
  The Miami Herald 
reported, “[l]ong email threads among Drake, [Mertz’s advocate], Mertz’s 
guardian, her behavior analyst, and hospital staffers beg[a]n on Aug[ust] 
[third], and bec[a]me increasingly frantic.”234  J. Rob Phillips, the Director of 
Clinical Services at North Tampa Behavioral Health, validated the hospital’s 
decision to keep the developmentally impaired woman in the hospital by 
stating in an email that Mertz had shown “suicidal ideation[s] and suicidal 
gestures” and that it would be sending Mertz to court to keep her in its 
facility.
235
  Meanwhile, Drake wrote back that the woman was not psychotic 
and, when he spoke to her over the phone, she sounded over-medicated 
causing her speech to be severely slurred.
236
  Access to the patient was 
regulated by the hospital, and the patient’s access to the court was dependent 
upon the facility or hospital where they are admitted.
237
  This holds true until 
the patient is deemed by a judge to have met the criteria for release, and he or 
she is released by the judge from the facility’s control.238 
                                                 
230. See Miller, supra note 128 (discussing how doctors referred to the 
patient’s confidentiality as a reason why they would not be able to provide more reasons as to 
why they were not releasing Mertz as requested). 
231. See id. 
232. See id. 
233. See id. 
234. Id. 
235. Miller, supra note 128. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(7)(d) (2016); Miller, supra note 128. 
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IV. DOE V. STATE:  DOES TELECONFERENCING BAKER ACT HEARINGS 
PROVIDE A NECESSARY REMEDY OR VIOLATE AN INDIVIDUAL’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS? 
Video technology developed and advanced at the same time that 
Florida’s judiciary confronted many financial limitations.239  Budget cuts 
forced courts and the judiciary to create new and efficient ways to meet the 
rigorous demands of their judicial obligations, and ultimately led to an 
inquiry into how technology could be used for efficient and effective 
change.
240
  Statutory prohibitions and rule-based prohibitions do not exist 
regarding the use of videoconferencing during Baker Act proceedings.
241
  At 
the time that the Supreme Court of Florida considered this case, case law did 
not exist stating that Baker Act hearings by videoconferences were 
prohibited by the Constitution.
242
 
On March 30, 2016, two seemingly innocuous email lines began a 
firestorm of legal debate, questioning the procedural validity, 
constitutionality, decision-making, and duties of judges with regard to using 
videoconferencing during Baker Act Hearings.
243
  As part of her daily 
routine, Judicial Assistant for the Honorable Judge Swett, Kate Hroncich, 
sent an email to Public Defender Kathleen Smith with the subject of Baker 
Acts on Friday.
244
  The email stated:  “Per Judge Swett, he will be doing 
Baker Acts beginning this Friday via Polycom.  Thank you.”245 
These two lines began a legal battle between mental health officials, 
attorneys for the mentally ill, and trial judges who presided over Baker Act 
hearings.
246
  The debate would highlight the problematic procedural structure 
of the Baker Act, showcase how the mentally ills’ due process rights can be 
easily violated, re-emphasize the importance and need for reform, and 
underscore the continued lack of effective reform.
247
  Beyond whether the 
judge’s email violated an established legal procedure, petitioners questioned 
whether the patients’ constitutional and due process rights were violated as a 
result of this procedure.
248
 
                                                 
239. Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 20. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 2. 
242. Id. 
243. See Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 2017); Petitioners’ Initial 
Brief at 5–6, Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017) (No. SC16-1852). 
244. Petitioners’ Initial Brief, supra note 243, at 5. 
245. Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1023; Petitioners’ Initial Brief, supra note 243, at 5. 
246. See Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1023. 
247. See id. at 1022; infra Part IV (A)–(C). 
248. Petitioners’ Initial Brief, supra note 243, at 1–2, 15. 
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A. The Practical and Procedural Costs of the 2004 Baker Act Reforms:  
Insufficient Resources and the Advent of Teleconferencing for Baker Act 
Hearings 
In order to understand the significance of Doe, the historical and 
legal context of the judges’ plight must be understood and considered.249  
Despite the legislature passing Baker Act reforms in 2004, the Florida 
Legislature had not added circuit or county judgeships in ten years to support 
the enactment of those reforms.
250
  Only in 2016, were twelve new 
judgeships recommended and announced by the Supreme Court of Florida.
251
  
Yet, these recommendations came ten years behind schedule as reforms from 
2004 increased judges’ workloads regarding Baker Act hearings.252  From 
2010 until 2015 alone, some counties reported a 50% or more increase in 
Baker Act evidentiary hearings for minors alone.
253
  With no new judgeships 
added, judges were required to meet the needs of these patients and conduct 
the hearings at the courthouse or at patients’ facilities.254  When judges 
commuted to patient facilities, they would often have to wait as patients met 
with their attorneys.
255
  Wait time and time lost in travel backed up the 
hearing schedule in an already bogged down system.
256
  Costs accumulated 
as a result of the travel and wait time incurred by judges traveling from 
facility to facility.
257
  Yet, the travel and wait time was not limited to 
judges—all legal and medical authorities involved in the case were also 
required to attend the hearings, imparting more fees on the state through the 
presence and appearance of state, medical, and law enforcement officials.
258
  
                                                 
249. See Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, supra note 207 
(discussing how Florida lawmakers have not added judgeships in a decade and how 
judgeships have been impacted by heavy burdens on the state’s fiscal health because of crises 
such as the mortgage crisis). 
250. See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13; Fla. S. Comm. on Child., Fams. & Elder 
Aff., 2004 Regular Session: Summary of Legislation Passed 83 (2004), available at 
http://archive.flsenate.gov/publications/2004/senate/reports/summaries/pdf/sessum04.pdf; 
Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, supra note 207. 
251. Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, supra note 207. 
252. See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13; Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for 
More Judges, supra note 207; Morel, supra note 206. 
253. Morel, supra note 206. 
254. Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13–15. 
255. Id. at 14 n.15. 
256. See id. at 14. 
257. Id. at 14–15. 
258. See id. 
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Meanwhile, judges would argue that the courthouse did not provide patients 
with a proper and safe setting to hold Baker Act evidentiary hearings.
259
  
Patients traveled to locations that were unfamiliar to them and followed strict 
protocols that were usually used to control “criminals or those accused of 
crime[s].”260  “The Baker Act [mandates] that the patients’ individual 
digniti[es] [be upheld and] respected at all times,” and these procedures were 
in direct opposition of that humane mandate.
261
  Holding cells were the only 
location where patients involuntarily committed could wait for their 
evidentiary hearings as no private or secure holding areas existed for 
patients.
262
  Meanwhile, placing patients in open and public areas caused a 
new host of problems as the patient presumably was involuntarily committed 
because he or she posed a danger either to himself or herself or the public.
263
  
By placing him or her in an open and public place, the respondent judges 
argued that this could cause the patient more harm and expose the public to 
unnecessary risks within the courthouse.
264
 
Further, medical facilities become responsible for relocating the 
patients to the courthouse, causing the state to incur more costs.
265
  
“[T]ransport service employees [would] not [necessarily] be law 
enforcement” officers properly trained to handle the risks of transporting 
such vulnerable patients.
266
  Escapes, medical emergencies, risk to the 
transport service employees, and increased costs to the state would all be the 
basis of the judge’s reasoning that teleconferences were appropriate and 
applicable to Baker Act hearings and could substitute the statutory in-person 
hearings held at the courthouse.
267
 
B. Doe v. State:  Petitioners Argue Baker Act Hearings Via 
Teleconferences Are a Violation of Patients’ Rights 
The issue at the heart of Doe was whether a judicial officer should be 
required to be physically present with the petitioners when Baker Act 
hearings were held—either by law or legal duty.268  The case was initiated 
                                                 
259. Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 15–16. 
260. Id. at 15 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.459(1) (2016)). 
261. Id. 
262. See id. at 15–16. 
263. Id. at 16. 
264. See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 16. 
265. Id. at 14–15. 
266. Id. at 16. 
267. See id. at 14–17, 20. 
268. Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1022–23 (Fla. 2017). 
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and filed with the Second District by fifteen petitioners, including John Doe, 
seeking relief from a seemingly off-the-cuff and without notice decision 
made by Judge Swett in Lee County that declared all involuntary 
commitment hearings would be held remotely.
269
  The Second District 
questioned the judgment of holding these hearings remotely, but held that 
conducting Baker Act hearings through teleconferences were “within the 
discretion of the court.”270  The Baker Act did not establish that judicial 
officers had a ministerial or indisputable legal duty to be physically present 
when they “presid[ed] over involuntary inpatient placement hearings.”271  
The majority of the district court panel reviewing the briefs submitted by 
both parties concluded that there was no “express legal right to have the 
judicial officer be physically present with the petitioners” during Baker Act 
hearings, and that no legal duty was outright expressed.
272
  However, they 
did determine the law clearly established that necessary mandamus relief 
“can derive from a variety of legal sources, including . . . rules of court.”273 
Judge Wallace wrote a concurring opinion with the majority where 
he expressed concerns about the law as it stood.
274
  The Second District did 
state that despite there being no express legal right to have a judge physically 
preside over Baker Act hearings, two problems did exist in the proceedings 
of the trial court:  (1) a court order supporting the judge’s arguments was not 
provided; and (2) the trial judge did not provide a reason for his decision to 
preside over involuntary placement hearings over teleconference.
275
  Even 
still, Wallace wrote in this opinion that while the majority held correctly, 
“the manner in which the trial judges . . . exercised [their] authority” over 
these hearings was unwarranted, inappropriate, and ill-advised.
276
  Despite 
his concurring opinion, Judge Wallace stated three reasons why conducting 
Baker Act hearings through teleconferencing equipment was questionable:  
(1) potential difficulties such as equipment malfunctioning and counsel not 
being able to approach the bench to speak in private; (2) the Supreme Court 
of Florida appointed a subcommittee on this topic in 1997, and the circuit 
court was disregarding the opinion of the subcommittee by continuing to 
                                                 
269. Id. at 1023. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. Doe v. State, 210 So. 3d 154, 157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 217 
So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017). 
273. Id. (quoting Nader v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87 So. 
3d 712, 723 (Fla. 2012)).  Established law does not have to only be defined by the legislature, 
but can also be derived from rules of court, statutes, constitutional law, and controlling case 
law.  Nader, 87 So. 3d at 723. 
274. Doe, 210 So. 3d at 159. 
275. Id. at 160–62. 
276. Id. at 159. 
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hold such hearings; and (3) similar procedures for juvenile hearings were 
used before and ultimately failed.
277
 
This begged the question of whether the silence by the legislature 
was an oversight or purposely excluded.
278
  The question became whether the 
silence on this procedure provided judges with a choice in how to handle 
such hearings, or if it was an oversight and the legislature assumed that 
longstanding traditions—always compelling the personal attendance of 
judicial officers at the evidentiary hearings and trials of which they preside—
would prevail.
279
 
Judge Lucas of the Second District Court of Appeal offered in his 
dissent that while no law required the physical presence of a judge in express 
terms,
280
 Bryant v. State
281
 established that the physical presence of a judge 
was constitutionally mandated in a criminal trial, unless waived.
282
  The case 
law held precedent that the physical presence of a judge was a bedrock 
principle and the reason it was not expressly stated in the law was because 
the physical presence of a judge or magistrate has always been a standard 
assumed as an elemental component to preside over trials and evidentiary 
hearings.
283
  The Baker Act hearings constitute evidentiary hearings; and as 
                                                 
277. Id. at 163–65 (discussing Florida’s videoconferencing experiment with 
juvenile detention hearings).  The Second District summarized the difficulties of 
videoconferencing in juvenile proceedings by referring to the Amendment to Florida Rule of 
Juvenile Procedure 8.100(A), which states: 
Independent observations confirmed the fears expressed by all who have strongly 
and continuously opposed the adoption of the proposed robotic procedure.  
Specifically, many observed that there was no proper opportunity for meaningful, 
private communications between the child and the parents or guardians, between 
the parents or guardians and the public defender at the detention center, and 
between a public defender at the detention center and a public defender in the 
courtroom.  The mechanical process produced a proceeding where, on many 
occasions, multiple parties would speak at once, adding to the confusion.  At the 
conclusion of far too many hearings, the child had no comprehension as to what 
had occurred and was forced to ask the public defender whether he or she was 
being released or detained.  It was also problematic that the public defender at the 
detention center often had no access to the child’s court file, and there was 
absolutely no opportunity to approach the bench to discuss private matters or 
anything that should not have been openly broadcast.  Moreover, perhaps because it 
was difficult for the children to see, hear, and understand what was taking place, the 
youth did not behave as those participating in person in a courtroom; that is, the 
hearings totally lacked the dignity, decorum, and respect one would anticipate in a 
personal appearance before the court. 
Id. at 165; Amendment to Fla. Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(A), 796 So. 2d 
470, 473 (Fla. 2001). 
278. See Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168. 
279. See id. 
280. Id. at 166–68. 
281. 656 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1995) (per curiam). 
282. Id. at 428–29. 
283. Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1024; see also Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168. 
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such, Judge Lucas argued that these court proceedings must be followed 
pursuant to the rules of evidence.
284
  Lucas argued that the advent and 
expansion of teleconferencing does not authorize judges to violate their 
duties as would otherwise be assigned.
285
  This was something implicitly 
assumed by the judges and magistrates who chose to use the technology as a 
substitute for their physical presence during evidentiary hearings.
286
 
C. Doe v. State:  Judges Argue that Technology Is a Necessary Remedy 
for Failed Baker Act Reforms and Increasingly Insurmountable Workloads 
The respondents in the Doe case argued in their Amicus Brief before 
the Supreme Court of Florida
287
 that the Supreme Court of Florida’s Task 
Force on the Management of Cases Involving Complex Litigation Report 
and Recommendations, published in 2008, stated that the Supreme Court of 
Florida should promote all courts throughout Florida to use 
videoconferencing when possible.
288
  The respondents pointed out in the 
same report that attorneys and judges were encouraged by the Supreme Court 
Task Force to use videoconferencing to resolve their cases more quickly.
289
 
The respondents argued, referring back to Judge Lucas’s dissent, that 
the Florida Rules of Evidence provided statutory authority that video 
recordings could be used to provide substantial testimonial evidence and 
witness statements.
290
  Important court appearances, such as criminal 
arraignments and first appearances, are often made by employing the use of 
technology.
291
  Medical experts testify using videoconferencing technologies 
during trial proceedings, and children testify during trial proceedings through 
videoconference calls in order to avoid trauma pursuant to Florida Statute 
section 92.55.
292
  Much in the same way that children need protecting, the 
judges argue in their Amicus Brief that the Baker Act provided several 
protections for the mentally ill and none were impeded upon by the use of 
                                                 
284. Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168. 
285. Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1027; see also Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168–69. 
286. Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168; see also Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1027. 
287. Answer Brief of Respondent at 10–11, Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 
2017) (No. SC16-1852); see also Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 2. 
288. See Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note 287, at 10–11. 
289. See id. at 10. 
290. Id. at 12 (citing Kelley v. Webb, 676 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996)); see also Doe v. State, 210 So. 3d 154, 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (Lucas 
J., dissenting), rev’d, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017). 
291. Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note 287, at 12. 
292. See FLA. STAT. § 92.55 (2016); Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note 
287, at 12. 
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teleconferencing.
293
  While the petitioners argued that the use of 
videoconferencing technology during involuntary commitment procedures 
infringes upon the due process rights of the mentally ill, the respondents 
quoted the holding of M.W. v. Davis.
294
  M.W. held that while the purpose of 
due process in substantive due process claims was to protect the fair 
treatment of individuals by using proper administrative justice, the purpose 
and validity of due process claims in procedural due process depended on the 
nature of the court proceeding.
295
 
The Chief Judge Jeffrey Colbath of the Fifteenth District wrote an 
Amicus Brief citing that the Florida Legislature had not added or created 
new county or circuit judgeships in a decade but expected the reforms to be 
enacted.
296
  In his brief, he described the specific struggles of judges in Palm 
Beach County who comprised the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.
297
  The struggles 
derived from the expanse of the county and the lack of judges and time 
needed to cover the area; the county is sixty-miles-long and forty-miles-
wide, with seven mental health facilities all serviced by only four magistrates 
who would travel to attend the Baker Act hearings.
298
  The public defender, 
the state attorney, the sheriff deputy, and the judicial officer would all travel 
to each facility housing patients where they would preside over each of these 
hearings.
299
  The Chief Judge argued that time and resources lost were a 
waste as these hearings could be easily performed over teleconference.
300
 
The Chief Judge also referred to cost concerns related to Baker Act 
proceedings.
301
  Travel-related costs would no longer be incurred by the 
judicial officer or the sheriff deputy’s office.302  The state attorney and the 
public defender’s offices would also save these travel costs.303  Furthermore, 
the facilities would also avoid the travel costs of transporting the patient 
between the facility and courthouse.
304
 
                                                 
293. See FLA. STAT. § 92.55; Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial 
Circuit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 2–3, 20. 
294. 756 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 2000); see also Answer Brief of Respondent, 
supra note 287, at 14. 
295. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 97. 
296. See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13. 
297. Id. at 14. 
298. Id. 
299. See id. 
300. Id. 
301. Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 14. 
302. Id. 
303. See id. at 14–15. 
304. Id. 
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The security of the patient and the public is also cited in the Chief 
Justice’s Amicus Brief.305  Specifically, the judge wrote that the courthouses 
were not well equipped to hold Baker Act hearings because patients could 
only be held in criminal holding cells.
306
  He argued that the Baker Act states 
in plain language that holding cells should not be used and avoided for Baker 
Act hearings.
307
  Holding a Baker Act patient in an open waiting area, who 
has been involuntarily committed because he or she is deemed either a 
danger to themselves or others, is an equally disconcerting idea as it would 
expose the public to a known and unnecessary risk.
308
  Security protocols are 
not as easily controlled when a Baker Act hearing is held within the 
courthouse, given the environment cannot be completely controlled by the 
security provided by the facility.
309
 
D. The Supreme Court’s Final Decision on Doe v. State:  
Teleconferences are Unconstitutional 
The Supreme Court of Florida in the Doe case ultimately held that 
the lack of resources and the struggles that the judges described did not 
outweigh the individuals’ constitutional rights to due process and liberty.310  
The expediency and problems with workload did not provide sufficient 
reason to validate holding Baker Act hearings by teleconference.
311
  The 
Supreme Court of Florida stated that in Baker Act hearings, unlike in 
criminal proceedings, the use of teleconference technology is not expressly 
sanctioned against by the statute.
312
  However, the Court did take issue with 
the way the judge incorrectly used his authority to determine that he would 
only preside over Baker Act hearings through teleconference technology.
313
  
The Supreme Court of Florida described Judge Swett’s actions as misguided 
wisdom and an overreach of authority.
314
  His decision did not meet the 
standards intended by the legislature that allows judges to use their discretion 
as to where and how to hold Baker Act hearings.
315
  Longstanding traditions 
require that judicial officers be present at trials and the advent of technology 
                                                 
305. Id. at 15. 
306. Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 15. 
307. Id. at 15. 
308. Id. at 16. 
309. See id. 
310. Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017). 
311. Id. 
312. Id. at 1025, 1028. 
313. Id. at 1031. 
314. Id. at 1031–32. 
315. See Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1023–25. 
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does not change this tradition, nor is it a reason to change this tradition, nor 
should it be assumed to change this tradition.
316
  The Supreme Court of 
Florida wrote that the legislature’s intent regarding how and where to hold 
Baker Act hearings was to benefit the patient only, and ultimately depended 
upon what was least injurious to the patient’s condition.317  With the patient’s 
conditions in mind, judges could use their discretion as to whether Baker Act 
hearings should be held in the courthouse or at the mental health facility.
318
  
The final conclusion regarding the respondents’ practical and logistical 
concerns was that judicial expediency never justifies the exercise of a judge’s 
discretion regarding Baker Act hearings.
319
 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The arguments made in the Amicus Brief of Chief Judge Jeff 
Colbath, while found to be insufficient to validate Baker Act hearings being 
teleconferenced, reflect a larger problem with the mental health system in 
Florida.
320
  Deinstitutionalization has created a mental health funding crisis 
with consistent decreases in funding provided to state-run treatment over the 
last three decades.
321
  In fact, after 2008, states were obligated to cut over $4 
billion in mental health spending, equating to the greatest decrease in 
spending and funding for mental health since deinstitutionalization began.
322
  
In 2004, seemingly needed calls for reform took place and many were 
applied, but without the proper funding to support those reforms.
323
  The lack 
of funding allotted to implement these reforms and the decrease in federal 
funding that justified the move towards deinstitutionalization left mental 
health facilities to find means—sometimes described as abuses—to pay for 
the treatments they were meant to provide.
324
  As recent as 2015, Governor 
Rick Scott proposed an increase of $19 million for mental health treatment, 
which ultimately was passed as a split between mental health and drug 
                                                 
316. Id. at 1027. 
317. Id. at 1025. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. at 1026. 
320. See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 1–3, 20. 
321. See Deanna Pan, Timeline:  Deinstitutionalization and Its Consequences, 
MOTHER JONES (Apr. 29, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/04/timeline-mental-health-america/. 
322. Id. 
323. See Pudlow, supra note 151. 
324. See Editorial, supra note 189; Miller, supra note 128. 
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treatment to be released over two years.
325
  This amount, while seemingly 
large, is dwarfed by the $150 million used by the New York Legislature to 
implement Kendra’s Law for its first five years in the 1990s.326 
With the proper funding, more licensed professionals could provide 
care and services, and the services could be more effective.
327
  Without the 
proper funding, the mental health system in Florida, and those who must 
orchestrate and provide Baker Act services, will be consistently providing 
the same services to patients who consistently return to treatment, and will 
become overworked because they work in an inefficient and, possibly, 
dangerous system—due to patients not receiving treatment in time, or acting 
without medicine, or simply living in constant threats of lawsuits.
328
  
Meanwhile, patients will continue to be misdiagnosed, mistreated, held 
against their will without due process, negated liberty, and held without 
treatment until the system can provide them with their court appearance.
329
  
Patients may even be incarcerated—for acts they commit while being 
improperly treated or misdiagnosed—by an underfunded and ineffective 
system.
330
  In the past, reforms were consistently made without sufficient and 
proper funding provided, which has created our present mental health care 
crisis.
331
  When funds were allotted, they were minimal and token amounts, 
unable to achieve the lofty humanitarian notions the Baker Act and its 
reforms strived to achieve.
332
 
The Supreme Court of Florida questioned the wisdom of the judges’ 
use of technology and their justifications for its use in Baker Act hearings in 
Doe.
333
  Yet, the Amicus Brief was not an attempt to abscond from the 
official duties of Baker Act hearings, but rather a diligent attempt to deal 
                                                 
325. Margie Menzel, Mental Health, Substance Abuse Reforms Get Approval, 
HEALTH NEWS FLA. (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.health.wusf.usf.edu/post/mental-health-
substance-abuse-reforms-get-approval/; Margie Menzel, State Leaders Look to Improve 
Mental-Health Funding, Policy, CBS MIAMI (Dec. 7, 2015, 9:41 PM), 
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2015/12/07/state-leaders-look-to-improve-mental-health-funding-
policy/. 
326. See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
327. See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119 
(explaining that as early as 2004, calls for reform were made to make the powers of the court 
more explicit).  Periods of patient observations needed to be extended beyond the standard 
fifteen minutes prescribed, and even with these two changes, major reductions in recidivism 
and mental illness turning into crime were expected.  Id. 
328. Editorial, supra note 189. 
329. See Gilliam, supra note 141; Killian, supra note 119; Torrey & 
Zdanowicz, supra note 179. 
330. Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 179. 
331. Gilliam, supra note 141; Pudlow, supra note 151. 
332. See Pudlow, supra note 151. 
333. Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017). 
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with an overwhelming and ever-increasing problem given the documented 
surge in involuntary commitments and too few professionals and officials 
managing involuntary commitments under the Baker Act within Florida’s 
Mental Health System.
334
  Reforms should be conceived and approved within 
the limits of the funding provided—rather than minimal funding being 
promised by legislature to provide token gifts of support to reforms that are 
not achievable—otherwise, the increased pattern of incarcerating the 
mentally ill will continue to cost the state more than if patients were to 
receive proper treatment from the beginning.
335
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given the most recent holding of the Supreme Court of Florida in the 
Doe case, the Florida Legislature should begin to rethink their reactive and 
token-funding approach to mental health.
336
  Proactive action needs to take 
place regarding mental health, where feasible reforms are enacted and a 
sufficient and healthy amount of funding is provided to ensure the success of 
the reforms.
337
  Baker Act reforms have consistently been underfunded and a 
response to crisis.
338
  The clear and convincing standard of dangerousness, 
either to one’s self or to others, is another pitfall that must be overcome 
because help is too often provided too little and too late.
339
  New legal 
definitions and grounds need to be created that better distinguish individuals 
who need involuntary commitments and those who solely just need mental 
health treatment and support.
340
  The definition of dangerousness needs to be 
expanded to include concerns about patients’ welfare, their ability to manage 
themselves healthily regarding self-care and neglect, as well as ensure that 
they are living in suitable living environments that promote mental health 
and self-care.
341
  A system responding to repeated crises without funding has 
created a system riddled with issues that make Florida’s Mental Health 
System a complex knot that must be untied; concurrent jurisdictions, 
disjointed action by competing authorities, a broken communication system, 
a concern for patient privacy, and a concern for funding underfunded 
hospitals all create a perfect storm where abuse threatens the patient’s liberty 
                                                 
334. See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
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at every turn and the fight between all competing and interested parties 
ultimately affect the patient whose interest they all allegedly aim to 
protect.
342
  These abuses do not begin in hospitals or courtrooms, but rather 
have been created on Florida’s Senate floor.343  The State of Florida needs to 
stop reacting to crisis and, instead, act to prevent crisis by putting real money 
into these reforms.
344
 
342. See W.M. v. State, 992 So. 2d 383, 386–87 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); 
Stavis, supra note 340, at 198; STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL 
HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 3; Killian, supra note 119.  Miller illustrates how 
competing interests and an inability to communicate clearly and effectively between parties 
interested in the treatment and status of Mertz ultimately led to a chaotic scene that kept Mertz 
in treatment or kidnapp[ed] depending on which party was addressing the status and topic of 
Mertz’s inpatient commitment.  Miller, supra note 128. 
343. See Pudlow, supra note 151; Editorial, supra note 189. 
344. See Pudlow, supra note 151; Editorial, supra note 189. 
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